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1.

Introduction

-

--

The use of differential weighting schemes for aggregating the
returns from public projects across income groups has become commonplace
in benefit-cost analysis.

In the economic literature, this practice has

received extensive support1 and somewhat less extensive criticism. 2 Ob
viously, the use of weighting schemes favouring poorer groups is motivated
by the concern of many, if not all, economists for the alleviation of
economic distress; but economists are not alone in feeling this way.
Private charity is a common feature of economic life, although the degree
to which it reduces income inequality is not always impressive.
The present paper aims to show that the existence of private
charity has important implications for benefit-cost analysis.

In particular,

it argues that the net returns from "small" public projects accruing to
different income groups connected by private charitable donations from
one to the other should be weighted equally in benefit-cost analysis.
This holds regardless of the degree to which the existing distribution of
income is judged to be non-optimal, whether this judgement is made before
or after the impact of private charity is taken into account, and regardless
of the detailed form of the government's "social welfare" function.

The

basic model is outlined in Section 2 and the central argument is presented
in Section 3.-

Section 4 then examines the degree to which this result

is affected by allowing charitable donations to be tax-deductible.
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2.

Private Charity
Consici er an economy contain ing three income groups :

and low.

Since

high, aedium

our ain is to focus on the distrib ution of income between

rather than within groups, we shrtll treat each group as consist ing
of a
single individ ual.

Each group receive s a lump sum income determi ned out

side the model and yi will denote the lump sum income of group i.

We

number the groups 1 through 3 and arrange them such that y 1 > y 2 > 1
y •
Each group may consume a part of its income and make volunta ry donatio
ns
to other groups with the remain der.
e

i

and the utility of group i

The consum ption of group i is denoted

will be express ed as a functio n of the

consum ption of all groups.

C

2

,

3

C ) •

The functio ns Ui

are strictl y concav e, twice differe ntiable and non-de creasin g in all
argume nts.
For the cleriva tives of Pi we sh--ill use the familia r notatio n U~
'. 1e

= aui /kj.

shall assume that prP.fere nces are such that donatio ns always take

the form of transfe rs to poorer groups , althoug h this assump tion may
easily
be relaxed withou t disturb ing the results .

Group 1 (the richest ) donates

to both groups 2 and 3, group 2 donates only to group~ and group 3
(the.
poores t) makes no donatio ns.

The consum ption of each of the three groups

is given hy
C
C

1
2

a::

y1

- V

a::

y2

-

V

1
(1)

'
2

+v

12
('.!)

and
(3)

were
h
v i d enotes t h e tota1 vo1unta ry d onat i ons of group i and v 12 d enotes
that part of group l's donatio ns going to group 7..
Groups 1 and 2 make their charita ble donatio ns separa tely.

Utility
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maximization in r,roup 1 requires, for an interior solution (v

1

>

0), that

where A is the marginal share of group l's donations going to group 2 and

-

O <A< 1.

If A is determined entirely by group 1 (is a control variable

for them) then,for O <A< J, A will be set such that

u11

=

u1

2

=

u1 ;
3

but it is

possible that A will be at least partly outside the control of group 1,
as in the case w~ere charity is administered institutionally .
maximization in group 2 we require, for v
U

2

>

O, that

2

2 • u3 •

Obviously

2

For utility

(5)

i

(4) and (5) state simply that charitable donations are made

up to the point where the marginal cost of a donation is equal to its
marginal reward, from the point of view of the donor.
It is important to stress at this point that private charity need
not generate an income distribution that is "optimal" from the point of
view of the government.

Suppose government planners possess a "social

2
3
1
welfare= function W(U , u , u ).
charity.

Then W need not be maximized by private

Indeed, the redistribution of income resulting from charity may

reduce W if the "social welfare" function is such that greater, rather than
less, inequality is desired by the government.

It seems difficult to reject

the hypothesis that there are governments for whom this is so.

Private

charity need not even generate a distribution that is Pareto optimal in
the usual sense.

In fact, in the present model it will virtually never

do so, provided charitable donations are made atomistically, as we have
assumed.
To see this in its strongest form, let group l's preferences be such
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that for v

12

c

O and v

1

>

o, u; u!.
<

This implies that group l's utility
1

1

1
is maximized by setting A• 0 and that in equilibrium u • u3 > u 2· For
1
2
2
2
group 2, we have from our earlier discussion u ~ u > u and for group 3,
1
2
3

d u3 > u3
3 > u3
U3
2·
3
1 an

Now imagine gr9ups 1 and 2 to have chosen their

optimal levels of voluntary donations, as above, and consider a contract
between them committing each to raise its donation to group 3 by one unit.
The effect on the utility of 1 each group is
= -

i = 1,2,3,

( fi)

Such a contract would be unanimously approved; the atomistic determination

\

.

of charitable donations generates an equilibrium that is not Pareto optimal~
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3.

Benefit-Cost Analysis
Now imagine the introduction of a public project having the net
i

effect B on the income of group i.

The effects on the consumption of the

three groups are by definition given hy
de
de

1
2

-= -dv

1

1

+ B

(7)

=

(8)

and
de

3

= (1 - A)dv

1

2

3

+ dv + B.

(9)

Simply summing these equations we obtain
B* •
i=l

(10)

i=l

We assume that the project is sufficiently "small" that equations
(4) and (5) hold hoth before and after the project is adopted.

That is,

the adjustment by groups 1 and 2 to the income changes caused by the
project does not lead either to move from an interior solution to its
utility maximization problem to a corner solution.

Equations (4) and (5)

may now be totally differentiated, and together with (10) this gives the
system
1

1

1

1

dc

Fl

F2

F3

dc 2

Gl

G2

G3

dc 3

where F

B
=

*
(11)

0
0

2
2
1 - AUl
1
- (1 - A) u3i) and G -= (U2i - u3i) •
1
1 .,. (Uli
21

Solving

this system we obtain
de i = B*Hi ,

i -= 1, 2, 3,

(12)
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The equilibrium change in the consumption of group i resulting from the proj e
i
is a constant, H,
multiplied by B* , the unweighted sum of the net benefits
.
i
of the project. It is easily seen from above that the H terms must
i

sum to unity.

For group i, H gives the share of the aggregate benefits of

the project which accrue, in equilibrium , to the consumption of group i.
The point is that these shares depend on preferences and not the initial
distributio nal impact of the project.

Relatively weak additional assumptions

will ensure the strict positively of each of the Hi terms.

For example, if

the utility functions are each additively separable, this result is guaranteed.

Nevertheles s, the strict positivity of the Hi terms is not implied

by our earlier assumptions .

Suppose Hi < 0 for some i.

It is easy to show

that an increase in any or all of the lump sum income terms, yj, then implies
a fall in the equilibrium consumption of group i; in particular, an increase
i

in y, holding all other lump sum income terms constant causes group i's
consumption to decline.
rH

1

This is clearly an extreme case.

Obviously, since

• 1, it is impossible for all the Hi terms to be negative, and intuitively ,

this would violate our assumption that utility functions are non-decreas ing
in all arguments.

Increasing all they i terms would then reduce both the

consumption and the welfare of all groups.
:'he change in the utility of group i is given by
3

* i
dUi = L Ui dcj = R* : U~j
- BK
j=l j
j=l j

(11)

The negativity of one or more of the Hj terms in (13) is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for Ki< 0.

Clearly, Ki< O implies that group

i is made worse off by an increase in any or all of the yj terms, including
i
Y, and this is clearly a pathologica l case. Provided each of the Hi terms
is positive,
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i
sign (dU)
A

a

* ,
sign (B)

i .. 1, 2, 3.

(14)

project benefits or harms each group according to whether the unweighted

sum of project net benefits is positive or negative, regardless of the
Projects may be ranked, from the

distributional impact of the project.

point of view of each individual, according to

*

B •

The possibility that

a project could benefit one group while harming another exists, but this
possibility rests entirely on the nature of group preferences (the remote
i

terms is negative) and not at all on

possibility that one or more of the K

the distributional impact of the project.
Suppose that Ki < 0 for some i.

Now consider a Bergson-Samuelson

3
2
1
social welfare function W = W(U, U , U ), with derivatives W.

J

j.

>

0 for all

Then the welfare impact of a project is given by
3

dW = E
j=l
If V

<

=

B

*

3
E

Il *V.

(15)

j=l

0 then a project for which B*

raising each of they

i

>

O·reduces welfare.

terms reduces welfare.

Similarly,

This case seems scarcely

worth considering but in this instance projects can be ranked inversely
according to B* .

Otherwise, with V

>

0, as we expect, projects may be

*
ranked according to B even in the seemingly unlikely case where one or
i
i
more of the H terms, or even the K terms, is negative.
Intuitively, the existence of private benevolence implies that the
fortunes of the various income groups are linked independently of the
distributional impact of the project.

The equilibrium welfare impact

of a project on each group depends on the aggregate net wealth generated
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by the project and not at all on the proportion of that aggregate net wealth
to that particular group.

accruing directly

This implies that projects

may be ranked, according to their welfare impact, by comparing the unweighted
sums of their net benefits.
sign (dW)

c

That is·,

*
sign (B)
If there are two or more mutually exclusive projects for

for each project.

which B* > 0, then the one for which B* is greatest has the most favourable
welfare impact.

This result is independent of the detailed nature of the

'social welfare function.

It holds regardless of the degree to which the

existing distribution of income is judged to he undesirable, whether this
judgement is made before or after the effects of private charity are
taken into account.

It holds even in the case, discussed at the end of

the previous section, where some other distribution of income is Pareto
superior to the existing one and where a redistribution of income would
be unanimously approved.

Finally, it holds even when private benevolence

redistributes income in the opposite direction from the redistribution
that the government would wish.
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4.

Tax-Deductible Charity
Charitable donations are frequently tax-deductible.

Since this

changes the marginal optimality conditions determining the levels of
charitable donations, the question arises of whether the introduction
of a tax system possessing this feature

will alter our conclusion that

the distributional impact of a project should be disregarded.

The answer

to this question proves to depend on the way tax revenues are treated and on
whether the receipts of charitable donations and project benefits are taxed.
We look at the question from the point of view of a project evaluat0r
for whom the tax system must be treated as given, regardless of its merits.
The discussion is confined to an examination of the implications of a fixed
tax schedule for benefit-cost analysis.
We shall suppose, for now, that tax revenues represent a pure loss
from the point of view of each income group.

While there is presumably

some other, governmental group benefiting from these revenues, for the time
being their interests will be treated as lying outside the scope of our
welfare analysis.

This assumption will presently be relaxed.

Let the

margiaal proportional tax rates applying to groups 1, 2 and 3 be fixed at
1
2
t , t and t3, respectively. Three alternative tax systems will be considered:
Table 1:

Three Alternative Tax Systems

Charitable
donations

Charitable
receipts

Case ( 1)

deductible

taxed

Case ( 2)

deductible

taxed

not taxed

Case ( 3)

deductible

not taxed

not taxed

Project
returns
taxed
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Charitable receipts and project returns taxed

Case ( 1):

The change in the consumption of each group, previously given by
equations (7) to (9) is now given by
de
dc
dc

1
2

3

• - dv
• ).dv

1

1

1
1
(1 - t ) + B (1 - tl),
(l - t 2) -

= (1 - >.)

av1

(16)

2
, ? (1 - t 2 ) + B2
(1 - t ) ,

c:V

?

3

( 1 - t 3) + av
. 2 (1 - t-) + B3 (1 - t )

.

(17)

(18)

respectively and summing we obtain

3 i
*
= I: B ¥ B •

(19)

i=l
The marginal optimality conditions applying to donations by groups 1 and
2 (previously equations (4) and (5)) now become

(20)

and

The analysis now proceeds exactly as before.

The equilibrium

solution corresponding to (12) is now
de i • Hi

*

B ,

i = 1, 2, 3

(1)

We can omit detailed discussion of the Hi

1

(22)

terms since they differ from

(1,

the H terms in (12) only by the presence of some multiplicative tax rates.
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Their qualitative form, interpretation and likely sign in the same.
ft

important feature of (22) is that the multiplicative term B
the unweighted sum of net project returns.

The

is, as before,

Projects may he ranked, from

the point of view of each group, accoiding to their aggregate net benefits,
regardless of the initial distribution of project benefits or of the dis
tribution of marginal tax rates.
Charitable receipts taxed; project returns not taxed
We now suppose the net benefits from projects to ta
which places them outside the tax system.

form

We now have

(23)

(24)
and
(25)

The marginal optimality conditions (20) and (21) are unchanged.

We elimi

nate the variables dv 1 and dv 2 from (23) to (25)
3

r de

3

i
=

i-=l

r

(26)

i=l

Proceeding as before, the resulting system gives the solution

i = 1, 2, 3. (27)

Again the Hi

terms need not be discussed, but now the distributional

( 2)

impact of the project becomes important.

If, as is frequently but not

always the case, wealthier groups incur higher marginal tax rates
(t

1

> t

2

3

> t ) then the appropriate weights to apply to the projects

benefits received by richer groups exceed those applying for poorer groups.

-12This counter intuitiv e, not to mention reaction ary, result is even stronge r
in case ( 3).

Case (3):

Charitab le receipts and project returns not taxed.

The techniqu e of analysis is now sufficie ntly clear that we can
pass directly to the main result, namely

de

i

i

B" ,

= H(3)

i = 1, 2, 3

(28)

where

B''

=

B1 (1 - A+ A/(1 - t 2)

(29)

1

(1 - t )

Again, the detailed form of the Hi
(3)

terms need not concern us, but

since the term (1 - A+ A/(1 - t 2 )) exceeds unity the premium applying to
the returns of group

1 is now even higher than that obtained in case (2 ).

These results may be understo od intuitiv ely by noting that the
tax-ded uctibili ty of donation s means that a dollar sacrific ed by the donor
generate s more than a dollar for the recipien t.

At the margin, these

quantit ies are, from the point of view of the donor, equally valuable .
So far as groups 1 to 3 are concerne d, this "magnif ication" at the margin
is analogou s to the return generate d by an intertem poral investm ent.

The

impact of a new infusion of funds (a public project) on the net wealth of
the three groups is measured by discoun ting the returns received by recipien t
(poorer)
groups. This is analous to discoun ting the returns generate d by
public projects in later time periods , the discoun t rate dependin g on the
rate of return availab le on intertem poral investm ents.

When project returns

are themselv es tax-ded uctible (case (1)), these effects cancel out, but
not otherwi se.
The above results for cases ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) should be treated with
caution.

This is especia lly clear when we relax the separati on between

groups 1 to 3 and the recipien ts of tax revenue s.

Define a new group,

-13grou p G, whic h rece ives tax reve nues and
whic h in addi tion eith er makes
char itab le dona tion s to, or rece ives them
from , some subs et of the othe r
thre e grou ps. Then we imm edia tely retu rn
to our earl ier resu lt. Proj ects
may be rank ed, from the poin t of view of
each of the four grou ps, acco rdin g
to the unwe ighte d sum of thei r net ben efits
.
To show this , we shal l supp ose ·that grou p
G makes volu ntar y dona tion s
to grou p. 3. We will also allow the poss
ibili ty that grou p G also rece ives
ben efits from publ ic proj ects . The util
ity func tion s of the four grou ps
. d as ui = Ui(c l, c 2
are now expr esse
3 c G) , i = 1, 2,
, c,
3, G,
G
wher e c deno tes the cons ump tion of grou
p G. We shal l supp ose that the
tax syste m oper ates as in case ( 2) abov
e and, for sim plic ity, that
grou p G is unta xed. Group G's util ity max
imiz ation give s
G

G

UG = u

3

(1 - t

3

)

.

(30)

Equa tions (20) , (21) and (23) to (25) appl
y as befo re, exce pt that
3
dvG (l - t ) must now be adde d to the righ
t-ha nd side of (25) , wher e dvG
is the chan ge in the dona tion s of grou p
G, and in addi tion we have
dcG = - dv 1 (t 1 - At 2 - (1 - >..)t 3) - dv 2
(t 2 - t 3 ) - dvG( l - t 3) + BG ' ( 3 l)
Simp ly summing equa tion s (23) to (25) and
(31) we obta in
3.

r

i=l

de

i

3

+ de G '"' r

i=l

- B

**

(32)

We tota lly diff eren tiate equa tion s (20) ,
(21) and (30) and toge ther with
(32) thes e give a four equa tion - four vari
able syste m with the solu tion
de i = J i B **

'

i = 1, 2, 3, G. (33)

The term s J i sum to unit y and agai n we expe
i
ct J > 0 for all i, but the
mul tipli cati ve term B** is agai n the unw
eigh ted sum of proj ect retu rns;
proj ects shou ld bera nked with out rega rd
to thei r dist ribu tion al impa ct. This
resu lt is also obta ined in each of the othe
r poss ible vari ants of the tax syste m.
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5.

Summary and Conclusions
The focus of this paper is on the distribution of income between

groups connected by private charitable donations from one to the other.
lt studies the impact of public projects on the consumption of the various
groups, taking into account the equilibrium adjustment of private charitable
donations to the income effects of public projects.

It is concluded that

the returns from "small" public projects accruing to different groups
connected in this way should be weighted equally in benefit-cost analysis,
regardless of the degree to which their incomes differ and regardless of
the precise form of the government's "social welfare" function.

These

results do not in any way require private charity to have equalized the
distribution of income or to have moved substantially in that direction,
and in fact they continue to apply when private charity redistributes
income in the opposite direction from the redistribution the government
would wish.
Although these results are complicated by allowing charitable
donations to be tax-deductible, these complications vanish once the
group receiving tax revenues (the government) is connected, via charitahle
donations, to other groups in the society.

From a methodological point

of view, these results are similar to those of the "rational expectations''
literature;

laking account of the equilibrium impact that public policy

decisions have on the decisions of individuals does not represent a mere
-"refinement" to the analysis, but alters its conclusions fundamentally.
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Footnotes

*This research was conducted while the author was Visiting Fellow,
Economic Growth Center, Yale University, on leave. from Monash
University, Melbourne. The paper has benefitted substantially
from the author's discussions with Brian n. Wright, but the
author is responsible for the views presented and any errors.
1

The many advocates of differential weighting schemes include
Weisbrod (1968), Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972), Little and
Mirrlees (1974), Lal (1974) and Squire and Van der Tak (1975).

2

3

critics include Harberger (1971) and (1978), Parish (1976) and
Ng (1978). Harberger (1978) provides a more extensive bibliography.
..

For a fuller development of this line of argument see Warr and
Wright (1979).
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